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Abstract— Electricity Markets are not only a new reality but an 
evolving one as the involved players and rules change at a 
relatively high rate. Multi-agent simulation combined with 
Artificial Intelligence techniques may result in very helpful 
sophisticated tools. This paper presents a new methodology for 
the management of coalitions in electricity markets. This 
approach is tested using the multi-agent market simulator 
MASCEM (Multi-Agent Simulator of Competitive Electricity 
Markets), taking advantage of its ability to provide the means to 
model and simulate Virtual Power Players (VPP). VPPs are 
represented as coalitions of agents, with the capability of 
negotiating both in the market and internally, with their 
members in order to combine and manage their individual 
specific characteristics and goals, with the strategy and 
objectives of the VPP itself. A case study using real data from 
the Iberian Electricity Market is performed to validate and 
illustrate the proposed approach. 
Index Terms—Electricity markets, intelligent decision making, 
multi-agent simulation, virtual power players 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The increasing fossil fuels shortage and the consequent 
increase of its price, supported by the implied environmental 
concerns that this type of fuel brings, led to a direct increase in 
the use of renewable energy resources. From the environment 
point of view the advantages of using renewable energy 
resources are clear. However, despite the favourable scenario 
to the distributed generation (DG) growth, there are important 
aspects to consider, both of economic and technical nature. 
Issues such as the dispatchability (namely in wind and 
photovoltaic technologies), the participation of small 
producers in the market and the maintenance high cost, are 
problems that must be overcome to take advantage of an 
intensive use of DG [1].  
Aggregating strategies can enable owners of renewable 
generation to gain technical and commercial advantages, 
achieving higher profits from the specific advantages of a mix 
of several generation technologies and overcoming serious 
disadvantages of some technologies.    
The aggregation of DG plants gives place to a new 
concept: the Virtual Power Player (VPP). VPPs are multi-
technology and multi-site heterogeneous entities. In the scope 
of a VPP, producers can ensure their generators are optimally 
operated. At the same time, VPPs will be able to commit to a 
more robust generation profile, raising the value of non-
dispatchable generation technologies [2]. 
To explore and study different approaches in dealing with 
these issues simulation tools are often used. Several modelling 
tools directed to the study of restructured wholesale power 
markets have emerged in the last years. Some relevant tools in 
this domain are “AMES” [3], and “EMCAS” [4]. For this 
purpose we use the MASCEM (Multi-Agent System for 
Competitive Energy Markets) [5, 6] simulator, which is a 
modelling and simulation tool that has been developed with 
the purpose of studying complex restructured electricity 
markets operation. It provides market players with simulation 
and decision-support resources, being able to give them 
competitive advantage in the market. Agents, representing the 
different entities in Electricity Markets, are allowed to 
establish their own objectives and decision rules. They have 
dynamic strategies that consider other agents’ behavior, 
learning from past situations and agents’ past actions. 
This paper addresses the operation of VPPs in the scope of 
the MASCEM simulator. The management of a VPP coalition 
must begin by providing adequate means for choosing the 
players that are more suitable to enter the aggregation [6]. For 
that a classification mechanism is presented, which analyses 
each player’s characteristics and tests their suitability to the 
VPPs objectives. This process provides the VPP with the 
knowledge of which producers are most likely to favorably 
contribute to the VPPs’ achievement of better results, and so 
allowing the VPP to decide which producers to aggregate or 
not in each moment. When stabilizing on a coalition, an 
internal negotiation is performed between each VPP and its 
aggregated members considering the forecasted generation of 
all the producers and their expected transaction prices [7]. 
After this internal dispatch, the VPP represents the aggregated 
members in the electricity market, where the necessary power 
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is sold or bought. This means that adequate and fair profits 
distribution methodologies must also be developed, taking into 
account the classification value that each member was 
awarded, in addition to the amounts of energy that it produced. 
After this introductory section, Section II presents an 
overview of the MASCEM simulator, including the 
considered market types and participating entities. Section III 
presents the proposed internal negotiation mechanism for 
VPP’s coalitions. This includes the acceptance procedure for 
candidate players, the internal dispatch and negotiation 
between the VPP and its members, and finally, the profits and 
costs distribution among the coalition participants. The 
proposed methodology is tested and validated in a case study 
presented in Section IV. This section presents a simulation 
performed using MASCEM, and a realistic scenario based on 
real market data from the Iberian market – OMIE [8]. 
II. MASCEM OVERVIEW 
MASCEM (Multi-Agent Simulator of Competitive 
Electricity Markets) [5, 9] is a modelling and simulation tool 
with the purpose of facilitating the study of complex 
electricity markets. The main entities that participate in those 
markets, such as market players and operators, are considered 
in MASCEM, and it aims to enable the simulation of the 
largest possible number of types of players and market 
models. MASCEM players’ can operate in day-ahead 
(symmetric and asymmetric) and balancing markets, 
considering both simple and complex bids, as well as in 
forward markets. Bidding strategies are also available, 
granting players’ competitive advantage in the market and 
allowing them to achieve the best possible results out of it. 
The main entities included in MASCEM are a market operator 
agent, an independent system operator agent (ISO), a market 
facilitator agent, buyer agents, seller agents, Virtual Power 
Player (VPP) agents, and VPP facilitators. 
The market operator is responsible for the market’s 
negotiation. He analyses and validates the buyer and seller 
agents’ bids according to the negotiation type, determines the 
market price, the accepted and refused bids, and the 
economical dispatch which then is sent to the ISO. 
The ISO represents the entity responsible for the system’s 
security and to assure that all constraints are met within the 
system. He analyses the technical feasibility from the power 
system point of view and solves congestion problems that may 
occur. 
The market facilitator acts as the market coordinator, but 
only as a computational entity since it does not represent a real 
market being. Market players register in advance within the 
market facilitator declaring their roles and services. The 
market facilitator regulates all existing negotiations, 
coordinating and assuring the proper market operation. 
Buyer and seller agents are the key players of electricity 
markets. The former may represent electricity consumers or 
even distribution companies, while the latest represent entities 
that are able to sell in the market, such as electricity producers. 
VPPs [2, 10] are players that represent alliances between 
smaller independent players, such as small producers, mainly 
based on distributed generation and renewable sources, or 
consumers, so they can participate on equal footing with big 
companies in the market. VPPs provide the proper means to 
their aggregated players, managing their information, and 
negotiating in the market representing their aggregates, where 
they are seen as regular buyer or seller agents. 
VPPs are modeled as a coalition of agents which allows 
installing agents on separate machines, maintaining the best 
possible performance. VPP facilitators [9] allow achieving 
such independence by managing the communications between 
VPPs and their members independently from the rest of the 
simulation. To participate in the electricity market VPPs send 
their bids to the market facilitator. 
The global structure of MASCEM is presented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 - MASCEM's global structure [11]. 
The simulation of the following market models are 
allowed in MASCEM: day-ahead pool (asymmetric or 
symmetric, with or without complex conditions), bilateral 
contracts, balancing market, forward markets and ancillary 
services. Hybrid simulations are also allowed by selecting a 
combination of the market models listed above.  
The user defines the number of buyer and seller agents in 
each scenario, as well as their intrinsic and strategic behavior 
for each market type. 
III. VPPS INTERNAL NEGOTIATION 
Due to environmental and fossil fuels shortage concerns, 
renewable energy resources are being more used. The 
advantages of using renewable are clear from the environment 
point of view. From the technical and economical point of 
view there are problems that must be overcome to take 
advantage of an intensive use of distributed generation. An 
aggregating strategy can enable owners of renewable 
generation to gain technical and commercial advantages, 
making profit of the specific advantages of a mix of several 
generation technologies and overcoming serious 
disadvantages of some technologies. The aggregation of 
distributed generation plants gives place to the new concept of 
VPP. VPPs integration into Electricity Markets is a very 
challenging domain that motivates our work regarding the 
evolution of MASCEM to appropriately simulate this entities’ 
operation. 
A. Members Acceptance 
In order to provide the VPP with the capability of choosing 
the most appropriate ways to manage its coalition, a 
classification structure that enables the VPP to choose at each 
moment the players that are most adequate for the VPP’s 
strategy and goals has been created . The VPP starts by 
defining its profile, including its characteristics, and then, 
when a producer requests to join the coalition, it will be 
classified through a set of formulas that relate the producers’ 
and the VPP’s characteristics. At each negotiation period the 
VPP will choose the best candidates to join the coalition. 
The players’ selection criteria are different for each VPP, 
depending on the dimension and on the already aggregated 
producers. In MASCEM, VPPs are classified according to the 
following five different types: 
 Parallel VPP (PVPP) – Includes different producers with 
distinct generation capacities, typically upper to 1MW and 
lower than 20 MW. The common characteristic is the 
participation in parallel markets; 
 Large Scale VPP (LSVPP) – Includes producers with large 
generation capacity, typically higher than 10 MW;  
 Micro VPP (µVPP) – These are composed of many 
producers with small capacity, typically lower than 2 MW; 
 Global VPP (GVPP) – This type of VPP aggregates both 
producers and consumers, assuming the function of a 
trader;    
 Several VPP (SVPP) – This VPP type does not have a 
priori defined characteristics so that it allows users to 
create more specific VPPs.  
Decision making for VPP formation and subsequent 
aggregation of more producers takes into account a large set of 
players’ characteristics (listed in the first column of table I). 
The weight of each of these characteristics depends on the 
VPP type, as shown in table I. These weights are based on 
economic criteria and on VPP market strategies. The 
characteristics weight ranges from 0 to 10.   
These values have been determined based on a set of a 
priori analyzed cases, considering possible VPP strategies and 
they are used by MASCEM as default values [6]. However 
MASCEM users can modify these values to adjust the VPP 
strategy according to their own needs.  
The user also has the possibility of developing and 
simulating scenarios in which VPPs change their aggregated 
producers, in order to improve VPP strategy according to the 
market evolution.   
TABLE I - Producers’ characteristics weights 
Characteristics PVPP LSVPP µVPP GVPP SVPP 
Speculative energy cost  10 10 9 9 10 
Dispatchability  7 9 7 10 7 
Reliability 7 8 2 8 7 
Use of installed power 5 7 2 5 5 
Lifespan 3 3 1 3 5 
Volatility of prices 7 8 3 7 7 
2nd Market 9 4 4 6 5 
GHG emissions 7 6 5 5 5 
Location 4 2 8 6 5 
Dimension 4 3 8 5 5 
Technology type 5 5 6 6 5 
Social Impact 5 5 5 4 5 
Maturity of technology 4 5 2 4 5 
Commercial behavior 5 6 3 5 5 
 
The classification structure increases VPP’s abilities to 
take the best decisions when confronted with particular 
situations (in this case, the election of the players who would 
be a greater asset to the coalition in the present and future, and 
contribute the most to the achievement of its objectives). 
B. Internal Dispatch 
The internal negotiation between each VPP and its 
aggregated members considers the forecasted generation of all 
the producers and their expected transaction prices. 
The VPP manages the resources (distributed generation, 
demand response and storage systems) of the aggregated 
players. In this level VPPs have two major goals: the first is to 
minimize the operation cost by supplying all loads as possible. 
The second goal is to enforce the established contracts with 
the aggregated players (producers and consumers). In the 
developed methodology all relevant aspects are considered, 
namely the power losses, which are a result of the AC power 
flow, and the network congestion, which are result of the 
constraints of lines thermal limits and the bus voltage limits. 
The solution of the first level is obtained based on a mixed-
integer non-linear programming problem [12]. The objective 
function represents the operation cost of each VPP and it can 
be represented as in (1) in a simplified way. 
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where G refers to the generation units, S to the storage 
systems, and L to the loads. PGen, PSt and PDR are the power 
of each generator, storage and load demand response program, 
respectively. cGen, cSt and cDR are the costs of each resource 
in period t. The problem was implemented in GAMS software 
[13]. 
C. Profits Distribution 
After the internal negotiations, the VPP is faced with one 
of two situations: the coalition presents a surplus of power that 
must be sold dispatched; or that is a lack of power to supply 
all consumers. This means that the VPP must enter 
negotiations with other entities to buy or sell the required 
amounts of power. These negotiations can be conducted 
through bilateral contracts with other VPPs in nearby control 
areas, or in the actual market negotiation, in which players 
submit their bids to the market. Players use the market to sell 
or buy the energy that they could not negotiate at better prices 
in other negotiation opportunities. Figure 2 illustrates the VPP 
process internally, inside its control area (level 1), and 
externally, negotiating with other VPPs (level 2), and/or in the 
electricity market (level 3). 
 
Figure 2 – Internal and external VPP process [7]. 
After submitting their bids, players wait for the market 
operator to determine the market price for each period, and the 
respective traded amounts of energy, according to the 
conjugation of all participating entities proposals. 
The deals that are achieved in the sale of power represent 
incomes for the VPP. These revenues from all the periods of 
negotiation must be distributed amongst the members of the 
aggregation. To manage those transactions, a profits’ 
distribution mechanism determines the amounts of payoff that 
the VPP members will receive.  
This algorithm is based on the total amount of energy that 
the VPP was able to sell in each period; the market price for 
that period; and the amount of energy that each producer 
provided individually, along with the classification awarded 
by the VPP at the time of its entrance in the aggregation. The 
use of this mechanism ensures that the payoffs adequately 
reward the producers that are better classified, and those that 
produced the most in each period. 
Regarding the case when a VPP enters negotiations to buy 
power, this represents costs, which must also be distributed 
among the players associated with the coalition. This is done 
through the settlement of tariffs to the buyer/consumer agents. 
These tariffs are defined and negotiated every time a player of 
this type enters the coalition of a VPP. A fixed value for the 
tariff is settled, and that is the price that the buyer agent will 
pay for the consumption of power throughout the duration of 
its contract with the VPP.    
IV. CASE STUDY 
This section presents a case study that aims to test, validate 
and illustrate the implemented approach, through a simulation 
performed in MASCEM. This simulation includes the internal 
negotiation that occurs inside the VPP, the actual electricity 
market negotiation, and the profits distribution amongst the 
members of a VPP. 
A. Case Description 
The presented case study considers 10 seller agents, 7 
buyer agents and 2 VPPs. The data used in this case study is 
based on real data extracted from the Iberian Market - OMIE 
[8]. The electricity market simulation is performed for the 
day-ahead spot market (symmetric pool), referring to 
Wednesday, 29th October. 
The players’ bids are defined as follows: 
Buyer 1 - This buyer buys power independently from the 
market price. The offer price is 18.30 c€/kWh (this 
value is much higher than the average market price); 
Buyer 2 - This buyer bid price varies between two fixed 
prices, depending on the periods when it really needs to 
buy, and the ones in which the need is lower. The two 
variations are 10.00 and 8.00 c€/kWh; 
Buyer 3 - This buyer bid price is fixed at 4.90 c€/kWh; 
Buyer 4 - This buyer bid considers the average prices of 
the last 4 Wednesdays; 
Buyer 5 - This buyer bid considers the average prices of 
the last 4 months; 
Buyer 6 - This buyer bid considers the average prices of 
the last week (considering only business days); 
Buyer 7 - This buyer only buys power if market prices are 
lower than average market price; 
Seller 1 - This seller needs to sell all the power that he 
produces. The offer price is 0.00 c€/kWh; 
Seller 2 - This seller bid considers the average between the 
average prices of the last 4 Wednesdays and the 
average prices of the last week (considering only 
business days); 
Seller 3 - This seller bid considers the average prices of the 
last 4 months with an increment of 0.50 c€/kWh, and it 
does not include complexity to its offering; 
Sellers 4, 5 and 6 - These sellers represent wind farms that 
offer a fixed value throughout the day. The offer price 
is 3.50 c€/kWh; 
Sellers 7, 8, 9 and 10 – These players represent a wind 
farm, a photovoltaic, a co-generation and a mini-hydro 
plant respectively; the offer price is based on 
generation costs of co-generation and on the total 
forecasted production. 
Finally, VPP 1 aggregates Buyer 1 and Sellers 4, 5 and 6. 
On the other hand, VPP 2 assembles Buyer 2 and Sellers 3, 7, 
8, 9 and 10. The simulation scenario is presented in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3 – Simulation scenario structure. 
B. Obtained Results 
After the simulation, it is possible to observe the results 
graphically in MASCEM. 
Regarding the internal negotiation of VPP 1, all sellers 
sold the available power within the VPP internal negotiation. 
On the other hand, Buyer 1 couldn’t buy all the required 
energy. Thus, VPP 1 presents a bid in the day-ahead electricity 
market to satisfy this player’s needs. VPP 1 is buying in the 
market. Figure 4 illustrates the results obtained by Buyer 1. 
 
Figure 4 - Buyer 1 results. 
As it is possible to observe from Figure 2, most of the 
energy bought by Buyer 1 was negotiated in the pool market. 
It is also visible that in some periods the market price is 
0.00c€/kWh. This is due to the fact that Seller 1 offered a 
considerable amount of energy at the price of 0.00c€/kWh, 
which was enough to satisfy the required power demand. 
Resulting from the internal negotiation of VPP 2, Buyer 2 
and Sellers 7, 8, 9 and 10 were able to meet their goals. In this 
case, Seller 3 was the player that did not sell all the available 
power in the internal negotiation of VPP 2. Thereby, VPP 2 
presents an offer to sell in the market. Figure 5 shows the 
results achieved by Seller 3. 
 
Figure 5 - Seller 3 results. 
By analyzing Seller 3 results in Figure 3, it is possible to 
verify that, unlike Buyer 1, Seller 3 was not able to meet all its 
goals in the market. This is explained by the fact that the offer 
of Seller 1 has determined the market price in those periods. 
Therefore, since the value offered by VPP 2 was higher in 
those periods, this player was not able to sell in all periods in 
the market negotiation. This can be seen in Figure 4, where 
the comparison between the seller agents’ bids is presented. 
 
Figure 6 – Sellers bids. 
From Figure 4 one can see that the bid of Seller 1 defined 
the market price in several periods, which originated the sale 
of power at 0.00c€/kWh in these periods. The individual 
profits obtained by Seller 3 in the sale of its production are 
presented in Figure 4.  
From Figure 4 it is visible that in spite of not having sold 
all of its power in the market, Seller 3 was able to achieve 
higher profits in the periods in which he sold in the market 
when compared to the profits obtained in the sale inside the 
VPP’s internal negotiation. This is visible by comparing the 
proportion of the light green bars in Figure 4 to those of 
Figure 3, which represent the amount of energy sold. Seller 3, 
as a small player based on a renewable energy source, was 
only able to achieve such profits through its aggregation to a 
VPP, that enabled this player to enter the market negotiations, 
which by his own was not possible. 
 
Figure 7 – Seller 3 profits. 
From the VPP’s point of view, the aggregation of Seller 3 
proved to be advantageous since the VPP was able to buy 
power from Seller 3 in the internal negotiations at a smaller 
price than the electricity market price, enabling the VPP to 
achieve higher profits for itself as well.   
V. CONCLUSIONS 
Competitive electricity markets are complex environments, 
involving a large number of different entities, playing in a 
dynamic scene to obtain the best advantages and profits. 
Financial and technical issues must be considered together to 
assure high levels of power reliability while keeping 
electricity prices reasonably low. 
This paper presented MASCEM – an electricity market 
simulator able to model market players and simulate their 
operation in the market. As market players are complex 
entities, each one with their own characteristics and needs, 
which must take their own decisions interacting with other 
players, a multi-agent architecture is used and proved to be 
adequate. MASCEM architecture has been improved to 
provide the means for VPP modelling and simulation. It 
includes simulation modules to deal with VPP operation, from 
production and load forecasting to real-time operation, after 
the market clearance. These tools provide support for the set 
of tasks the VPP have to deal with, including reserve 
management, strategic bidding and producers’ remuneration.  
This paper has mainly focused on VPPs’ internal 
negotiation, considering coalition formation, i.e., producers’ 
aggregation, taking advantage of the proposed classification 
mechanism, and also of the methodologies for internal 
dispatch and profits distribution.  
The proposed mechanisms for classification and coalition 
entrance and management have proven to be a good asset, and 
they provide the VPP with a feature that allows it to better 
adequate its actions to the constantly evolving environment.  
The methodology proved to be advantageous both for 
VPPs and for the aggregated players, as showed in the 
presented case study. The VPP is able to ensure power at 
lower prices inside the coalition, while small dimension 
aggregated sellers gain the possibility to sell power in 
electricity markets through the VPP. Finally, buyers achieve 
fixed costs for the consumption of power, being less subject to 
electricity prices’ constant changes.    
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